This paper studies the first nationwide introduction of automatic enrolment, in which employers in the United Kingdom are obliged to enrol employees into a workplace pension scheme, which employees can then choose to leave if they wish. We exploit the phased rollout of automatic enrolment since 2012 to estimate its effect on pension saving. As a result of automatic enrolment, participation in workplace pensions among eligible private sector workers is estimated to have increased by 37 percentage points, and workplace pension membership reached 88% amongst those affected by April 2015. Automatic enrolment significantly increased the average pension contribution rate, in part because some newlyenrolled employees received an employer contribution well above the minimum mandated by the government. Furthermore, many employees who did not have to be automatically enrolled were nonetheless brought into a workplace pension scheme as a result of the policy. We find no evidence of employers reducing employer contributions for newly-hired employees or existing members of workplace pensions.
I. Introduction
There are concerns about individuals undersaving for retirement in countries across the developed world. In response, policymakers have proposed -and economists have studieda large variety of schemes designed to increase individuals' saving for retirement. 1 One instrument to increase saving for retirement of particular interest is 'automatic enrolment', where employers have to enrol employees automatically into a workplace pension scheme, which employees can then choose to leave.
This paper studies the effect of the first nationwide introduction of automatic enrolment. We exploit the phased roll-out in the United Kingdom of the obligation for employers to enrol their eligible employees into a pension automatically since 2012 to estimate its effect on saving in a workplace pension. This is of interest not least because automatic enrolment is becoming a more popular policy internationally. By 2016, California, Connecticut, Illinois and Oregon have all legislated to introduce automatic enrolment (Munnell et al., 2016) .
Although automatic enrolment has been prominently highlighted as a particular success story of the real-world implementation of the insights of behavioural economics (Benartzi and Thaler, 2013; Madrian, 2014; Chetty, 2015; Thaler, 2016) , until now all the evidence on the impact of automatic enrolment on participation in employer-provided pensions and pension saving comes from the voluntary introduction of automatic enrolment by large firms in the United States (see Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004) ). In many cases, these firms have introduced automatic enrolment to comply with the Internal Revenue Service's non-discrimination rules 2 (see Choi et al. (2002) and Butrica and Karamcheva (2015) ).
Since employers are obliged (in the UK) to enrol their employees automatically, with a minimum employer contribution, automatic enrolment increases the cost of employing workers. Any response by the employer to the policy may have a significant impact on pension saving. This is particularly important as, prior to automatic enrolment, 70% of contributions to employer-provided defined contribution (DC) pensions in the UK were made by the employer and only 30% by the employee. 3 Therefore, the effects of automatic enrolment in boosting pension saving could be diminished, or potentially enhanced, by the behaviour of employers in response to the policy. This kind of impact cannot be identified when automatic enrolment is introduced voluntarily by employers.
We find that automatic enrolment has led to large increases in the pension participation rates and in the total contributions to workplace pensions. For eligible private sector employees, automatic enrolment led to an increase of 37 percentage points in the probability of participating in a workplace pension scheme. By 2015, 88% of eligible private sector employees who were enrolled automatically were a member of a workplace pension. The policy increased the total contribution rate to a workplace pension (expressed as a percentage of total earnings) by 1.05 percentage points, compared with a pre-reform average of 7.0%, therefore significantly boosting pension saving. This was due, in part, to some employers enrolling their employees into pension schemes with employer contributions well above the minimum contributions mandated by the government. We do not find evidence of employers reducing the employer contributions to newly-hired employees or to existing pension scheme members as a way to mitigate the increased labour cost. We also find substantial spillover effects of the policy: the pension participation rates of workers who did not have to be automatically enrolled increased by 18 percentage points. Overall, we estimate that the impact of automatic enrolment has been to boost private sector saving in a workplace pension by around £2.5 billion per year by April 2015, with this almost certain to rise as the policy continues to be rolled out to affect smaller employers.
There are a number of mechanisms by which the introduction of automatic enrolment may increase pension participation and increase the proportion of employees saving the default minimum amount. First, automatic enrolment substantially reduces the complexity of the decision of whether to save in a pension. There are default contribution rates and default investment allocations under automatic enrolment (although many, but not all, employers that offered workplace pensions before automatic enrolment had certain default investment allocations). Automatic enrolment therefore 'decouples' the participation decision from the contribution rate or investment allocation decision. The decision whether to cease participation is simpler than the full investment allocation decision. This should lead to higher participation because complexity of a decision is known to lead to individuals putting 3 Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. off the decision (Tversky and Shafir, 1992) . Indeed, evidence from 'quick enrolment', in which individuals can enrol in an employer's savings plan with a pre-selected contribution rate and asset allocation, has been found to lead to increases in plan participation of between 10 and 20 percentage points (Beshears et al., 2013) . Iyengar et al. (2004) also find that the higher the number of funds offered in a pension plan (looking at those with a choice of at least two), the lower the probability of participating, due to the increased complexity of choosing between the funds.
Second, individuals deciding whether (and how much) to save in a pension may have problems with 'self-control' and may procrastinate over this decision. This procrastination comes about because people think that they will save more in the future, but they are naive and, when the 'future' arrives, they put off saving once again. O' Donoghue and Rabin (1999) show that under these circumstances, individuals will not change their asset allocation from a bad investment even when there are low transaction costs, because they think (wrongly) they will instead do it in the future. This form of procrastination would imply that individuals will not opt out of a pension when automatically enrolled (because they can always do it later), but will actually continue to stay in, and at the default rates.
Third, the fact that employees are defaulted into a pension scheme under automatic enrolment may mean that the employee sees the default as an endorsement, either from the employer or from the government. Beshears et al. (2009) argue that individuals may see the default option as implicit advice on the best course of action, particularly if they are not financially literate.
This may be less the case in the introduction of automatic enrolment studied in this paper.
The minimum contribution rates (the minimum employer contribution is 1% of a band of 'qualifying earnings' and the minimum total contribution is 2% of qualifying earnings) are so low that it is unlikely that the employer or government is endorsing them and, indeed, the minimum total contribution rises to 8% of qualifying earnings in 2019. However, the fact that individuals are defaulted into a workplace pension may prevent people from opting out because they see that policy recommends that people become members of the pension scheme.
Fourth, there are some individuals who are automatically enrolled in a pension who were not previously offered an employer contribution to their pension. When introduced in the UK, automatic enrolment mandated employers to make contributions of at least 1% of qualifying earnings, and the minimum total (employee and employer) contribution is 2% of qualifying earnings. Some employees who previously did not want to be part of a workplace pension, either because they did not want to save for retirement at all or because they saved outside a workplace pension scheme, may choose to be in their workplace pension in order to be able to receive the employer contribution.
Overall, these four mechanisms would suggest that automatic enrolment is likely to increase both the proportion of eligible employees participating in a workplace pension and the proportion of employees contributing the minimum amounts.
Previous empirical evidence on the impact of automatic enrolment has been based on its voluntary introduction by employers in the US. Madrian and Shea (2001) compare two cohorts of employees at a large healthcare firm in the US, where the cohort hired later were enrolled automatically into a 401(k) scheme, with a 3% default employee contribution and with all funds invested in a money-market scheme (i.e. invested in government and commercial bonds with short maturity). They find that participation rates in the pension scheme increased dramatically for the cohort that were enrolled automatically, with 86% of employees enrolled in the 401(k) after 3-15 months, compared with only 37% of those who
were not subject to automatic enrolment. Moreover, they find that the 3% default contribution was extremely salient; almost 65% of the cohort eligible for automatic enrolment had contributions equal to the default rate, and the proportion with higher contributions fell, implying that automatic enrolment led to some employees contributing less than they would have in the absence of automatic enrolment. The authors also find that many employees stuck with the default investment strategy.
The defaults introduced into the pension saving decision have also been found to be highly persistent, such that three years after automatic enrolment, half of participants contribute the default and are invested in the default portfolio (Choi et al., 2004) . Chetty et al. (2014) find that only 15% of people respond actively to automatic pensions contributions (by reducing other saving), implying that, for most people, higher pension saving due to automatic contributions is not offset by reductions in other saving.
It is not only from the literature on automatic enrolment that defaults have been found to be very important in determining saving behaviour. Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) study the privatisation of Swedish Social Security and find that a third of people remain with the default funds, even though they were actively encouraged to choose their own portfolios. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) find that, even when individuals have to choose to be part of a savings scheme, the default of 'automatically escalating' contributions leads to much higher rates of savings. Goda and Manchester (2013) show that, in a firm where the default pension scheme changes from being a defined contribution to a defined benefit (DB) pension scheme at age 45, the proportion enrolled in the DC scheme falls by 60 percentage points. On the other hand, Bronchetti et al. (2013) study a randomised experiment where 10% of a tax refund is defaulted into a savings bond and find little evidence of any effect on total savings.
There is no evidence from other countries whose governments have introduced automatic enrolment. This is because, in the rare cases where it has been introduced by governments elsewhere, it has been very partial or introduced alongside a set of other changes. Chile introduced automatic enrolment between 2012 and 2014, but only for self-employed workers, and no opting out was allowed from 2015 on (see OECD (2014)). New Zealand introduced automatic enrolment into its 'KiwiSaver' scheme, with minimum contributions of 3% from both employer and employee. However, this scheme was also combined with a 50% match rate from the government, and the government 'kick-started' the savings account with a NZD$1,000 payment, making it hard to distinguish the effect of automatic enrolment from the effect of the introduction of the other savings incentives.
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Given that automatic enrolment is found (in this and other papers) to increase participation in pension schemes, this is likely to increase the labour costs of employing a worker who is eligible for automatic enrolment. There are a large number of possible responses by employers faced with this higher labour cost. One could be to reduce the wages or salaries of employees (as compensation in the form of a pension has risen), which might be expected in a competitive labour market in which employees value these benefits and where wages are flexible (see Summers (1989) ). Alternatively, employers that previously offered employer pension contributions above the minimum could reduce the contributions offered towards the minimum level. These responses would limit the extent to which automatic enrolment increases savings for retirement.
There has been limited published literature on whether employers that introduce automatic enrolment offer lower employer contributions, as a way to limit the increase in labour costs associated with the increased participation in pension schemes. Butrica and Karamcheva (2015) find in a cross-section of US private sector pension funds that, controlling for a set of firm and plan characteristics, employer match rates are 0.38 percentage points (11%) lower under automatic enrolment. On the other hand, Andrietti (2015) uses plan-level panel data and finds a positive association between automatic enrolment and employer match rates. One difficulty with this literature has been establishing a convincing counterfactual for those employers that introduce auto-enrolment. This is because employers have chosen to introduce automatic enrolment, and employers that decide to do so (and employees who work for those employers) may be different from employers where automatic enrolment is not introduced.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the institutional setting for pensions in the UK and the details of the introduction of automatic enrolment there.
Section III describes the data used in this paper, Section IV sets out the empirical strategy and Section V presents the results. Section VI concludes.
II. Policy background a) The UK pensions policy environment
Here we set out briefly the pensions policy environment that provides the background to the introduction of automatic enrolment in the UK. 5 We describe here the state pension system from April 2016, which will be the system for the vast majority of employees currently working in the UK. This system, legislated in the Pensions Act 2014, replaced a system that had a lower 'basic state pension' and the option of an 'earnings-related' state pension for those who did not have an employer-provided pension. For many more details of the new system and how it has changed, see Crawford et al. (2013) . draw on their pension pot in any way they want. Contributions to DB pensions also attract tax relief, and DB pensions are taxed upon receipt in the same way as DC pensions, although the age at which an income from these schemes can start to be received depends on the exact scheme rules.
While a large majority of public sector workers are active members of an employer-provided pension scheme (85% in 2012), only 36% of private sector employees were in 2012; the latter figure had fallen from 50% in 1997 (2005)). The obligation to enrol eligible employees automatically has been introduced gradually, starting in October 2012.
Here we set out the details of the policy as they were implemented by the government.
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Employees are eligible for automatic enrolment if they are aged at least 22, are aged below the state pension age and earn more than a given earnings level. In 2015-16, this level was £10,000 per year. 9 Employers can postpone automatically enrolling new employees for up to 3 months. Once automatic enrolment is introduced by the employer, all eligible employees must be enrolled into a pension scheme, which they are then able to choose to leave at any point.
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Employers introducing automatic enrolment must enrol their employees (who have not actively elected not to be enrolled in the pension) into a pension with (at least) minimum levels of contributions. Up to and including March 2018, the minimum employer contribution is 1% of qualifying earnings and the minimum total contribution is 2% of qualifying earnings, where the 'total' is the sum of employee and employer contributions, including any tax relief. 'Qualifying earnings' are earnings in a certain band set by the government. In 2015-16, qualifying earnings were those between £5,824 and £42,385 per year. 11 The minimum total contribution will increase to 5% of qualifying earnings from April 2018 (with a minimum of 2% from the employer) and to 8% from April 2019 (with a minimum of 3% from the employer). Employers can choose to enrol their employees automatically into schemes with higher (employee and employer) contributions, although they are prevented from setting the employee contribution rate so high as to deliberately encourage a large proportion of employees to opt out.
Employees can cease being in a pension scheme at any time. To do this, employees must inform their employer, confirming that they do not want to be enrolled in the pension scheme.
If employees opt out within one month of being enrolled automatically, any contributions they have made to the scheme will be repaid in full. If employees opt out at a later time, any contributions will remain invested. Employers are required to re-enrol any eligible employees who have left the pension scheme around 3 years after the employer's staging date.
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The obligation of employers to enrol their eligible employees automatically has been introduced gradually since October 2012. Each employer is given a 'staging date'. Employers must automatically enrol eligible employees from this date, unless they apply to postpone enrolment by up to 3 months from the staging date. An employer's staging date is determined by the number of employees the organisation employs in April 2012, as measured by the number of employees on its Pay-As-You-Earn scheme (the scheme by which income and payroll tax payments are withheld from employees' earnings). Appendix Table A1 sets out the staging dates for employers based on the size of the employer. Employers can introduce automatic enrolment earlier than their staging date if they wish, although they must inform the Pensions Regulator that they are doing so.
Employers with 120,000 or more employees were the first employers to be affected, with a staging date of 1 October 2012. By February 2018, all employers will have had to introduce automatic enrolment. This affects both public and private sector employers, although some large public sector pension schemes had already introduced automatic enrolment prior to 2012. For example, all teachers in England and Wales aged 18 to 70 were enrolled automatically into the Teachers' Pension Scheme from January 2007, and all full-time teachers were enrolled automatically prior to 2007 (see Emmerson and Wakefield (2009) however, they can opt in to join the scheme, where employers and employees must make minimum contributions. Employees earning below £5,824 per year (in 2015-16) are 'entitled workers'. They are not enrolled automatically but can apply to join a pension scheme, although their employer does not have to make a contribution.
III. Data
The data used in this paper are from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), which is collected by the UK's Office for National Statistics (ONS). ASHE is a survey of employees with the survey being completed by employers in April of each year. 14 Data are available from April 1997 to April 2015. The survey is approximately a 1% sample of employees in Britain, with employees included in the survey if their National Insurance (NI) number 15 ends in a specific pair of digits. This sample frame means ASHE is a panel data set following the same employees over time. 16 The number of responses to this survey was 181,052 in 2015. 17 The data are stored at the job level, meaning that if an individual has two jobs, they will appear twice in the data in that year (and these can be linked to each other).
The ASHE data include detailed information on the pay and hours of work of each employee.
Given that the survey is completed by employers with reference to their payroll records, these data are thought to be the most reliable measures of earnings of any publicly available UK data set (see Gregg et al. (2014) ). Importantly for this paper, the survey asks whether the employee was a member of a workplace pension scheme ('run or facilitated by [the] organisation'). From 2004 onwards, it also asks how much the employer and the employee contributed to the pension.
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The ASHE data contain a number of variables on the employee, including, age, sex, occupation, job tenure, whether the job is a temporary contract, and region. It also contains information on the employer, such as industry and sector (public/private). Using these data, we can define the set of individuals who are 'eligible' for automatic enrolment: those aged 22
to state pension age, earning more than the automatic enrolment threshold (£10,000 per year in 2014-15) and who have been working for their employer for at least 3 months.
In this paper, our main outcomes of interest are the participation in a workplace pension scheme and the pension contribution rates. We define an individual to be participating in a workplace pension scheme if their employer indicates they are a member of a workplace pension scheme and the employer does not record there being a zero contribution to the pension (from employee and employer combined). We calculate pension contribution rates by dividing the amount contributed by employee or employer by total pay in the pay period.
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We 'top code' the employee and employer pension contribution rates at the 99 th percentile of the distribution of the contribution rates of private sector employees who are in a pension scheme in 2012.
Most importantly for our empirical strategy, the data contain a measure of the number of employees in the employer in each year. This measure comes from the UK government's business register. This is crucial because, as was discussed in Section II, it is the number of employees employed in April 2012 that determines when employers are obliged to introduce automatic enrolment.
Figure 1. Workplace pension membership rates among public and private sector employees, 1997 to 2015
Note: 'Eligible' means those aged 22 to state pension age, earnings over automatic enrolment threshold, working for employer for over 3 months. It does not restrict to those employers where automatic enrolment had been introduced. Source: Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
It is instructive to show the rates of pension membership and the contributions to workplace pensions prior to automatic enrolment being introduced. Figure 1 uses the ASHE data to show how pension membership has changed from 1997 to 2015. It is clear from the figure that public and private sector workers have had very different participation rates in pensions.
The proportion of private sector employees in a workplace pension scheme fell from 48% in 1997 to 33% in 2012, before rising to 56% in 2015, indicating that automatic enrolment has potentially increased pension membership. Looking only at those meeting the automatic enrolment eligibility requirements (those aged 22 to the state pension age, earning over the threshold and in work, but not restricting to those employers where automatic enrolment had Tables 1a and 1b show the distribution of pension contribution rates, from employees, employers and total, including non-participants prior to automatic enrolment (in April 2012).
These distributions include the proportion without any contributions because they are not in a pension scheme. It shows that there are very few employees with very low, positive contribution rates, which are the levels at which the minimum contributions are set under automatic enrolment. Looking at employee contributions, 24% of employees contribute between 2% and 10%, with very few contributing more than 10%. On the other hand, 14% of employees have an employer contribution of more than 10% of earnings. Looking only at those who are eligible for automatic enrolment working for an employer with 58 or more employees (and therefore auto-enrolled by April 2015), they are significantly more likely to have higher employer and employee contribution rates.
In Appendix Table A3 , we provide descriptive statistics on private sector employees in 2012 working in employers with 58 or more employees who are eligible for automatic enrolment.
They have median gross weekly earnings of £460, 61% are male, 89% work full-time, over 50% of them have worked for their employer for 5 years or more, they have a median age of 41 and they work across a wide range of industries, of which the largest are 'retail and wholesale' and 'manufacturing', employing 20% and 16% of the employees respectively. Note: Square data points indicate periods when employers were over 3 months past their staging date, and therefore had to enrol their eligible employees automatically. Circular data points indicate employers that are past their staging date, but not 3 months past their staging date and so are 'partially affected'. Source: Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. sizes, grouped together based on when they were eligible for automatic enrolment. It shows that between 2009 and 2012, the membership rates of each group move in a similar way, although, on average, employees working for larger employers have higher membership rates than those working for smaller employers.
In Figure 2 , data points in which employees are enrolled automatically are shown with a square data point (and a circle for those who are 'partially affected' by automatic enrolment).
Those periods in which employees are enrolled automatically see far higher pension membership rates than prior to automatic enrolment, with participation rates under autoenrolment of between 80% and 90%, suggesting that there is a large impact of automatic enrolment on pension membership.
IV. Empirical methodology
Using ASHE data on pension membership and contribution rates to pensions of eligible private sector workers, we can estimate the causal impact of automatically enrolling eligible workers on different measures of pension saving. To do this, we exploit the roll-out of the obligation of employers to introduce automatic enrolment for their eligible employees, where the largest employers are affected first, as described in Section II. Since the ASHE data only observe each employee in April of each year, we can calculate whether an employee works for an employer that has introduced automatic enrolment based on the date and the size of the employer. We can sort employers into seven 'employer size groups' based on whether automatic enrolment was in place in April of each year (specifically on the ASHE reference date, shown in Appendix Table A2 ). These groups are shown in Table 2 .
If an employer has not reached their staging date by April of a given year, automatic enrolment was not in place. In April 2012, none of the employers were past their staging dates. Once employers have reached their staging date, they can postpone automatic enrolment for up to 3 months; therefore the employer may not have introduced automatic enrolment for the first 3 months after the staging date. In April 2013, employers with between 6,000 and 29,999 employees were in this situation. We do not know whether they have introduced automatic enrolment, but many of them will have. For this reason, we categorise them as 'partially affected'. Finally, employers that are at least 3 months past their staging date must have introduced automatic enrolment (assuming that they are complying with the individual is in a job and they meet the eligibility requirements for auto-enrolment, they will be enrolled automatically, even if it is not their main job. The roll-out of the obligation to enrol eligible employees automatically means that we can estimate the causal effect of automatic enrolment on membership of a workplace pension and the contributions into it using a difference-in-difference empirical strategy. Employees (and employers) are affected by automatic enrolment at a given time exogenously based entirely on how many employees there were in 2012 and the roll-out timetable chosen by the government.
Equation (1) sets out the difference-in-difference specification that we use to estimate the impact of automatic enrolment:
(1) .
We want to estimate the effect of automatic enrolment on an outcome (such as pension membership) y, for an individual i, working for an employer in 'employer size group' f, observed at time t. is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if automatic enrolment is in place in the employee's employer when they are observed, and 0 otherwise.
is the coefficient of interest. It is also necessary to control for the fact that some employees work for employers that are 'partially affected'. We therefore introduce a dummy variable for being 'partially affected', which varies for each year that there are people who are partially affected (2013 to 2015):
We control for fixed differences in the outcome for employees working for employers of different sizes using six 'employer size group' fixed effects and we control for time using year fixed effects . Under this specification, we assume that the 'employer size group' fixed effects are fixed over time. This is the usual common trends assumption which says that, in the absence of the reform, affected and unaffected employees would see their pension membership and contribution rates change in the same way. The evidence from Figure 2 suggests that pension participation does indeed evolve in the same way over time for employees working for firms of different sizes.
We also control for a vector of characteristics of employees and the employers they work for, X. These include controls for sex, age (in cubic), job tenure (three dummies), dummies for working for a non-profit institution, being in a full-time job, the job not being the individual's 'main' job and the job being temporary, 10 regional dummies, 12 dummies for industry of the employer and 8 dummies for occupational category of the employee. The full list of covariates can be found in Appendix Table A6 .
We do not include individuals who work for employers who had between one and four employees in 2012. This is because the pension membership and contributions rates are unlikely to evolve in a similar way to those for larger employers, partly because many employers with only one employee may be sole proprietors. Moreover, prior to 2012, employers with fewer than five employees did not have to provide a pension scheme if requested by the employee.
The primary outcomes of interest are the effects of automatic enrolment on the probability of membership of a workplace pension scheme and on the level and distribution of contributions. We estimate the effect on the probability of pension membership using a linear probability model and a probit model, the effect on mean contribution rates using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the effect on the distribution of contributions using multinomial logit models (and, as a robustness check, multinomial probit models). The models are estimated on employers. The sample size for each 'employer size group' in each year is shown in Appendix Table A4 . There are a small number of individuals with missing pension contributions, so the sample size for the effect on pension contributions is 452,212.
Since automatic enrolment is implemented by employers, and they may implement it in slightly different ways (particularly in terms of how much they offer as an employer contribution), there may be a correlation in the error between employees working for the same employer. In headline results, we therefore cluster our standard errors at the employer level. We show the number of clusters (employers) as well as the number of observations (employees) underlying each regression in our results section. For some results, we also show how the standard errors change when we instead cluster at the individual level.
V. Results a)
Effect of automatic enrolment on membership of a workplace pension Table 3 reports the results of estimating the effect of automatic enrolment on the proportion of employees who are members of a workplace pension, using equation (1), with the dependent variable being a dummy indicating whether the employee is participating in a workplace pension. Our preferred specification is specification 5, which estimates the effect using a probit model, controls for the characteristics of employees (X) and clusters the standard errors at the employer level. We find that automatic enrolment substantially increases the proportion of employees participating in a workplace pension, by almost 37 percentage points. This compares with a pre-reform (2012) membership rate of 49% of eligible employees working for employers with 58 or more employees. By 2015, eligible employees in employers of the same size had a pension membership rate of 88%. With pension participation rates under automatic enrolment nearing 90%, these are similar to the rates found by Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004) in their studies of US firms.
The alternative specifications in Table 3 show that this result is robust to estimating the model using a linear probability model (specifications 1-3) rather than a probit model (as shown in specifications 4-6) and to not controlling for control variables X (specifications 1 and 4). The full results of the OLS regression (in specification 2) are shown in Appendix Table 3 , the effect of automatic enrolment is highly significantly different from zero (at below the 1% level). Almost all of the 37 percentage point increase was due to increased membership of DC pension schemes (a 35 percentage point effect), with only a 1 percentage point increase in the membership of DB schemes, an effect which is not statistically significantly different from zero at standard significance levels. One test of validity of this empirical strategy is to conduct a placebo test, in which we see whether there is an effect when we would not expect there to be one. In order to do this, we imagine that automatic enrolment had been introduced in exactly the same way, but 3 years earlier, such that in April 2010 employers with more than 30,000 employees had automatic enrolment in place, by April 2011 it was in place for employers of 350 or more, etc. We then estimate the same equation (1), except using data from 2009 to 2012 (all years are prior to auto-enrolment actually being introduced). Table 4 shows that, using both a linear probability model and a probit model, there is no effect. The tiny point estimate is not statistically significant, even when we cluster our standard errors at the individual level rather than the employer level. Note: *** denotes that the effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All models estimated by OLS including control variables (X, listed in Table A6 ). Standard errors clustered at the employer level. 'Membership rate of eligible employees' in 2012 and 2015 is based only on eligible employees working for employers that had 58 or more employees in 2012. Source: Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
The increase in participation in workplace pensions caused by automatic enrolment is heterogeneous, which is not surprising because, prior to automatic enrolment, different groups of workers had very different membership rates. Table 5 shows the effect of automatic enrolment on different subgroups. These are the results of estimating equation (1) only on given subgroups (using a linear probability model and including control variables). Overall, it
shows that those groups that had the lowest pre-reform pension membership rates see the largest impact of automatic enrolment, but that those groups with the highest pre-automaticenrolment membership rates still have the highest rates after its introduction. For example, automatic enrolment increased pension membership of 22-to 29-year-olds by 52 percentage points, compared with a baseline of 28%, whereas the effect for those in their 40s was 31
percentage points, compared with a base of 56%. By 2015, the membership rate of eligible employees in employers with 58 or more employees was 85% for those in their 20s, compared with 90% for those in their 40s.
Table 5 also shows that there is a larger effect for people with low job tenure than for those with high job tenure -increasing the membership rate by almost 54 percentage points for those in their first year with an employer, compared with 27 percentage points for those with 5 or more years with the employer. Before automatic enrolment, job tenure is highly correlated with pension membership, and while there is still a positive relationship after automatic enrolment, it is much less pronounced.
We also divide the sample into quartiles of the weekly earnings distribution in each year (restricting only to eligible private sector employees) and look at the effect on each quartile.
The effect for the lowest earnings quartile of eligible employees (in April 2015, this was composed of those earning between £10,000 and £16,730 per year) is 54 percentage points, compared with only 16 percentage points for the highest quartile, with the participation rate for the highest quartile reaching 94% in 2015. There is a slightly larger impact for women than for men (although not statistically significantly different), and a larger increase for those working for private or publicly-listed companies as opposed to non-profit institutions, such that by 2015 the two types of employers have very similar pension participation rates.
b) Effect of automatic enrolment on workplace pension contribution rates
While the impact of automatic enrolment on pension membership is clear, the impact on the levels of contributions made into workplace pensions may only be quite small (and could even be negative), if those who are newly enrolled into a pension scheme are enrolled at the legal minima (1% of qualifying earnings from employer, 2% of qualifying earnings in total)
and if the introduction of the default means that some employees reduce their contributions to the default level, as is found in Madrian and Shea (2001) .
We estimate the effect of automatic enrolment on the mean pension contribution rates (from employee/employer/total) using equation (1) with these outcomes as the dependent variable.
The results of this are shown in Table 6 . It shows that there was an increase in the mean employee contribution rate by 0.45 percentage points, from a baseline of 2.1% in 2012 (a 21% increase). The effect on employer contribution rates was larger, at 0.60 percentage points (although this increase is a lower fraction of the pre-reform mean). The effect on the mean total contribution rate was 1.05 percentage points, compared with an average contribution rate of 7.0% in 2012 prior to automatic enrolment being introduced. All of these impacts are statistically significant at the 1% level. Note: *** denotes that the effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Estimated by OLS including control variables (X, listed in Table A6 ). Standard errors clustered at the employer level. Contribution rate is the weekly amount contributed by the employee/employer to the pension, as a fraction of gross weekly earnings. Total contribution rate is the sum of the employee and employer contribution rates. Source: Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
In order to estimate what impact automatic enrolment has had on overall pension saving (in £ per year), we can estimate the effect of automatic enrolment on total pension contributions in £ per week using the same methodology (by estimating equation (1) Note: For the bands with upper and lower contribution rates (e.g. 1% to 2%), the contributions are strictly greater than the lower value and weakly less than the higher amount. *** denotes that the effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Estimated using a multinomial logit model by maximum likelihood including control variables (X, listed in Table A6 Because the mean contribution rate includes zeros, and is affected by some high contribution rates (generally from DB schemes), it is potentially more interesting to estimate the impact on the distribution of contribution rates, by banding contributions together and estimating the probability of being in a given band of contributions, e.g. contributing between 2% and 5% of earnings. We split the distribution of contribution rates into five bands and estimate a 21 Note that this includes individuals enrolled in a pension scheme prior to the introduction of automatic enrolment.
multinomial logit model of the effect of automatic enrolment on the probability of being in each band. Table 7 shows the estimated effect on employee, employer and total contribution rates.
As well as the large falls in the proportion with no contributions (the mirror image of the increase in membership), there are very large increases in the proportion with low positive contribution rates, on both the employee and employer side. We find that there is an increase of 20.0 percentage points in the proportion of employees contributing between 0% and 1%, compared with a baseline of essentially no one contributing this little in 2012 (as shown in Table 1a ). There is a similar increase in the proportion of employees receiving an employer contribution of between 0% and 1%. The minimum default of 1% of qualifying earnings as employer contribution (2% total contribution) has led to a very large increase in the proportion saving small amounts through a workplace pension.
However , Table 7 also shows that, on both the employee and employer side, automatic enrolment has caused a large increase in the proportion of employees saving well over the minimum contribution rates. Not only is there an increase in the proportion with employee contributions of 1% to 2% (6.0 percentage points), but there is also a significant 5.6
percentage points increase in the proportion with employee contributions of 2% to 5% of earnings. On the employee side, this means that individuals are not responding to the default minimum by reducing their contributions towards it, as is found by Madrian and Shea (2001) .
Instead, there is an increase in the proportion making contributions that are much higher than the minimum. This is an important result, because one of the worries about the introduction of automatic enrolment is the fact that it has (in some introductions) led to some people saving less, prompting calls for other policies such as auto-escalation (see Benartzi and Thaler (2013) ).
Although our results do not rule out this behaviour, they show that if it is present then the lower saving is more than outweighed by the effect of employers and employees contributing more than the minimum. One reason for this could be the fact that employers are enrolling their employees automatically into schemes with much higher employer contribution rates than the minimum and that they also have higher minimum employee contributions. Indeed, there are also significant impacts of automatic enrolment on the proportion of eligible employees who are receiving 2% to 5% in employer contribution (6.5 percentage points ) and even on the proportion with employers contributing 5% or more (4.1 percentage points).
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One reason for the increase in contributions that are well above the statutory minimum could be that employers are introducing automatic enrolment with the long-run minimum contribution rates (which will be in place from 2019 onwards) of a total of 8% of qualifying earnings. To investigate this possibility, we create bands of contribution rates as a fraction of qualifying earnings and estimate the effect of automatic enrolment on the probability of being in each band using a multinomial logit model. The results are shown in Table 8 . Looking in particular at the total contributions, automatic enrolment has led to an increase of 5.2
percentage points in the proportion of individuals receiving more than the long-run minimum levels of contributions ('Above 8.1%'). 23 This means that the increase in contributions that are well above the statutory minimum is not simply explained by employers choosing to move straight to the long-run minimum contribution rates. Note: For the bands with upper and lower contribution rates (e.g. 1.1% to 5.1%), the contributions are strictly greater than the lower value and weakly less than the higher amount. *** denotes that the effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Estimated using a multinomial logit model by maximum likelihood including control variables (X, listed in Table A6 ). Standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping the average marginal effect of automatic enrolment 250 times, while clustering at the employer level. Number of observations: 452,212. Number of clusters (employers): 64,428. Source: Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
As mentioned in Section I, one reaction of employers to automatic enrolment could be to reduce the employer contributions of newly-hired employees. In Table 9 , we estimate the effect of automatic enrolment on individuals who have worked for their employer for less than a year. Among employees in firms with automatic enrolment who had worked for their employer for less than a year, 70% were hired after their employer's staging date. The results in Table 9 confirm that automatic enrolment caused a large fall in the proportion of people with no contributions (larger than the effect for all eligible employees) and that there was a larger impact of automatic enrolment on increasing the proportion with very low contributions. However, automatic enrolment also led to sizeable increases in the proportion of employees contributing more than 2% (and more than 5%) of salary and in the proportion receiving higher employer contributions too. This means that, if some newly-hired employees were offered lower employer contributions than before, this is more than offset by other individuals receiving higher employer contributions than mandated by the legislation. This is true even when looking at those who might be most likely to receive lower employer contributions -employees aged 22-29, earning less than median earnings, who have worked for their firm for less than a year (not shown in the table). Note: For the bands with upper and lower contribution rates (e.g. 1% to 2%), the contributions are strictly greater than the lower value and weakly less than the higher amount. *** denotes that the effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Estimated using a multinomial logit model by maximum likelihood including control variables (X, listed in Table A6 ). Standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping the average marginal effect of automatic enrolment 250 times, while clustering at the employer level. Number of observations: 147,834. Number of clusters (employers): 23,241. Source: Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Note: For the bands with upper and lower contribution rates (e.g. 1% to 2%), the contributions are strictly greater than the lower value and weakly less than the higher amount. Industry is defined by three-digit SIC (2007) code, subject to some being aggregated together, and a small number being disaggregated to the four-digit level. There are 210 industries in the private sector under this definition. Pay quartile is based on the median pay of employees in the industry in 2012. *** denotes that the effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Estimated using a multinomial logit model by maximum likelihood including control variables (X, listed in Table A6 ). Standard errors (shown in square brackets) are estimated by bootstrapping the average marginal effect of automatic enrolment 250 times, while clustering at the employer level. Source: Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
One way to try to understand these results (of finding that automatic enrolment leads to increases in the proportion of employees with higher employer contribution rates) is to look at whether this effect is heterogeneous across different employees. In Table 10 , we split employees into four groups, based on the median level of pay in their industry in 2012. We define industry using three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (2007) codes, leaving us with 210 industries. 24 Table 10 shows that the fall in the proportion of employees with no employer contribution is larger in low-paying industries and that the rise in the proportion with employer contributions of 0% to 1% is much higher in low-paying industries. There are also still large increases in the proportion of employees in lower-paying industries who are automatically enrolled into pension schemes with higher employer contributions. However, 24 There are a few exceptions: we aggregate some small industries together, and we disaggregate very large ones using the four-digit SIC code.
of the people brought into a pension scheme by automatic enrolment, they are much more likely to be enrolled in a scheme with a higher employer pension contribution rate if they are in a high-paying industry. This may be because high-paying industries are much more likely to have had higher pension membership rates prior to automatic enrolment, meaning that automatic enrolment is a lower additional cost for them (as a proportion of their labour costs) and so they are less likely to default people into a scheme with the minimum employer contribution as a way of limiting the cost of the scheme. Finally, another way that firms may have reacted to automatic enrolment is to reduce the amount of employer contributions to those already in a workplace pension scheme. To investigate this possibility, Table 11 
c) Effects of automatic enrolment on non-eligible employees
Automatic enrolment potentially has impacts on those who are not eligible for automatic enrolment, for two main reasons. First, as described in Section II, those who are ineligible for automatic enrolment but earn at least £5,824 per year (known as the lower earnings limit or LEL) can ask to be enrolled in a pension. They may want to do so (even if they did not want to prior to automatic enrolment) as peer effects have been shown to influence pension plan participation (Duflo and Saez 2002) , so increased participation of eligible workers might encourage non-eligible workers to ask their employers to enrol them in a scheme. Second, employers automatically enrol employees when they are eligible and employees could continue to participate even if they are no longer formally eligible. Although this is not a Note: *** denotes that the effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All models estimated by OLS including control variables (X, listed in Table A6 ). Standard errors clustered at the employer level. Analysis restricted to those earning at least the lower earnings limit in the year they are observed. Source: Authors' calculations using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. The fact that there are large spillover effects of automatic enrolment on the pension participation rates of non-eligible workers is both interesting and important, even though we cannot distinguish the exact mechanism that is causing it at the moment. If it is that these employees are asking to participate, it cannot be that procrastination was causing them not to enrol previously. However, it could be because the decision is now less complex, because of the endorsement factor or in order to receive the employer contribution. Given that there is evidence of employees not enrolling in pension schemes even when there are no mandatory employee contributions (see Benartzi and Thaler (2007) ), it might be unlikely that employees asking to participate is the major driver of this impact.
On the other hand, it could be that employers are choosing to enrol their non-eligible employees automatically into a pension scheme, even though this will come at some cost to the employer. This would be more evidence of firms choosing to pay more in pension remuneration than is mandated by the legislation introducing automatic enrolment. One piece of evidence for this is that, when looking at the effect of automatic enrolment on employer contributions of non-eligible employees, the proportion of employees receiving more than 1% contribution rose by 5 percentage points, suggesting that many of those who are participating are receiving more than the minimum contribution.
By estimating the impact of automatic enrolment on the total pension contributions of noneligible private sector employees, we can estimate the impact that the spillovers of automatic enrolment have on total pension saving (in the same way as was done for eligible employees in Section Vb). Given that the spillover effect increases non-eligible employees'
contributions by £0.80 per week (see Table A5 ) and we estimate there are 3.4 million non- 26 We do not look at the effect on those earning less than £5,824 per year. This is because historically, the ASHE data have captured those employees earning under the LEL relatively poorly. For more details, see Adam et al. (forthcoming) .
eligible private sector employees working for employers who had introduced automatic enrolment by April 2015, this implies the spillover effects increase pension saving by £0.1 billion per year. In addition to the effect on eligible employees, automatic enrolment has increased private sector pension saving by around £2.5 billion per year by April 2015.
VI. Conclusion
With concerns about undersaving for retirement across the developed world, there is intense interest amongst economists and policymakers regarding policies that can boost saving for retirement. This paper has studied the first nationwide introduction of automatic enrolment in which employers are obliged to enrol employees into a workplace pension scheme, which employees can then choose to leave if they wish. We exploit the roll-out of the obligation in the United Kingdom for employers to enrol their eligible employees automatically into a pension between 2012 and 2015 to estimate the effect of automatic enrolment on saving in a workplace pension.
We find that the introduction of automatic enrolment substantially increases the probability of participation in a workplace pension scheme, by 37 percentage points. In 2015, after automatic enrolment had been introduced, the workplace pension membership rate for private sector employees who were eligible to be enrolled automatically reached 88%. The largest effects on pension membership were seen for those with the lowest membership rates prior to automatic enrolment: those in their 20s, lower-paid employees and those who have joined their employer more recently.
These increases in pension membership have led to large increases in saving in a workplace pension by employees eligible for automatic enrolment, on average increasing the total workplace pension contribution rate (expressed as a percentage of earnings) by 1.05
percentage points, compared with a pre-reform average of 7.0%. This effect is large in part because a large fraction of employers are making employer contributions above the minimum mandated under the automatic enrolment legislation. While the proportion of employees receiving between 0% and 1% of earnings as an employer contribution rose by 21 percentage points, the fraction receiving more than 2% rose by 11 percentage points.
These are effects that cannot be estimated by studying the voluntary introduction of automatic enrolment. They show that how employers respond to the obligation to enrol their employees automatically has an important impact on the policy's effectiveness at boosting pension saving. We find no evidence of employers responding to automatic enrolment by reducing the employer contributions to newly-hired employees or to employees who were participating in a workplace pension scheme prior to the introduction of automatic enrolment.
We also find important evidence that the policy has led to large increases in the participation rate of employees who are not eligible for automatic enrolment, by 18 percentage points on average, probably driven by employers deciding to enrol non-eligible employees automatically as well as eligible employees. Overall, we estimate that the impact of automatic enrolment has been to boost private sector saving in a workplace pension by around £2.5 billion per year by April 2015, with this figure very likely to rise as the policy continues to be rolled out to affect smaller employers.
There are a number of further considerations when understanding the impact of automatic enrolment on saving for retirement. First, in 2018 and 2019, minimum contribution rates (from employees and employers) will be increased to reach a total of 8% of qualifying earnings (of which 3% from the employer). While many employees are already making contributions above this 'long-run' minimum level, for some employees the change will lead to higher employee contributions -which could potentially lead to higher fractions of employees deciding to leave their workplace pension scheme (particularly if individuals are credit constrained or if they feel the larger increase in the employee contribution is not worth the employer contribution they would receive as a result) -and to higher employer contributions, which could lead to employers taking action to mitigate the rise in employer costs.
Second, this paper does not consider where the incidence of higher employer contributions (caused by automatic enrolment) falls. By increasing employer pension contributions, automatic enrolment increases the cost of employing labour. We have no evidence of employers reducing their offer of pension contributions in response. Other responses could be for employers to reduce wages and salaries or reduce employment (both of which would also reduce the employer's payroll taxes), to increase prices, or for the higher labour cost to depress firms' profits. Indeed, 18% of employers surveyed by the Department for Work and Pensions (2016a) reported that they had had lower wage increases in response to automatic enrolment. But analysis of this is outside the scope of the present paper.
Third, this paper only looks at the effect of saving through a workplace pension. It is possible that increases in saving in a workplace pension are offset by reduced saving elsewhere, principally in 'personal pensions' (pensions arranged completely independently of the employer), or in other savings accounts or assets. However, given that one of the reasons that automatic enrolment is thought to increase pension saving is procrastination (which leads to people not joining in the absence of automatic enrolment and not leaving once they are enrolled), we may not think that many individuals are 'active' enough to reduce their other saving in reaction to automatic enrolment (as is found by Chetty et al. (2014) ).
Nevertheless, this paper has shown that the UK's implementation of automatic enrolment has so far led to substantial increases in workplace pension participation and saving. This is likely to lead to many individuals having higher levels of private resources for retirement than they would have had in the absence of this policy. 
